

seem to us 'elementary mistakes' in Durkheim's work. We know much more than Durkheim about these matters simply because we live almost a hundred years later. No modern anthropologist or sociologist will concur nowadays with Durkheim's assertion that simpler societies lack restitutive sanctions. We have come to learn from Malinowski and his disciples that pre-modern societies rely to a large extent on reciprocal obligations – be it of individuals or of groups of individuals. Such societies are largely based on restitution whenever the reciprocal balances between the various forces of society are upset. Whether the rule be an eye for an eye or the return of another piece of cattle when one has been wrongfully appropriated, simple societies, contrary to Durkheim, seem in fact to be at least as devoted to the law of restitution as are modern societies.

In similar ways, Durkheim's attempt to distinguish between types of societies along the axis of likeness v. complementarity fails to be satisfying if it is realised at the hand of new anthropological studies that Trobriand Islanders or natives of New Guinea differ in personal characteristic to a highly significant extent. But such a distinction has still much to recommend itself if, instead of making polar distinctions we limit ourselves to relative differences. It may be that the presence or absence of literacy in human groups may be a better distinguishing mark between them than the Durkheimian distinction (see Jack Goody, *Domestication of the Savage Mind*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1977), yet it remains the case that later typological distinctions were in large part stimulated by Durkheim's earlier effort.

Criticism of Durkheim has become in our days a minor cottage industry, I hence feel no need in this brief introduction unduly to extend my critical objections. To be sure, a variety of Durkheim's findings, some of his major methodological assertions, and above all his frequent polemical exaggerations, need to be rejected by contemporary scholarship. But this is as it should be if it is agreed that continuous attempts at refutation and correction mark the very nature of scientific discourse.

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## Preface to the First Edition

This book is above all an attempt to treat the facts of moral life according to the methods of the positive sciences. Yet this term 'method' has been employed in a way that distorts its meaning, and it is one to which we do not subscribe. Those moralists who deduce their doctrine not from an *a priori* principle, but from a few propositions borrowed from one or more of the positive sciences such as biology, psychology or sociology, term their morality 'scientific'. This is not the method we propose to follow. We do not wish to deduce morality from science, but to constitute the science of morality, which is very different. Moral facts are phenomena like any others. They consist of rules for action that are recognisable by certain distinctive characteristics. It should thus be possible to observe, describe and classify them, as well as to seek out the laws that explain them. This is what we intend to do for a few of these facts. The objection will be raised regarding the existence of freedom. But if this fact really does imply the negation of any determinate law, it is an insuperable obstacle not only for the psychological and social sciences, but for all the sciences. Since human volition is always linked to some external forces, this renders determinism just as unintelligible for what lies outside us as for what resides within us. Yet none disputes the possibility of the physical and biological sciences. We claim the same right for our own science.<sup>1</sup>

Thus understood, this science is not opposed to any kind of philosophy, because it takes its stand on very different ground. It may be that morality has some transcendental finality that experience cannot attain. This is a matter with which the metaphysician must deal. Yet what above all is certain is that morality develops

over the course of history and is dominated by historical causes, fulfilling a role in our life in time. If it is as it is at any given moment, it is because the conditions in which men are living at that time do not permit it to be otherwise. The proof of this is that it changes when these conditions change, and only in that eventuality. Nowadays we can no longer believe that moral evolution consists in the development of one self-same idea, held in a muddled and hesitant way by primitive man, but one that gradually becomes clearer and more precise as enlightenment spontaneously occurs. If the ancient Romans had not the broad conception of humanity that we possess today, it is not because of any defect attributable to their limited intelligence, but because such ideas were incompatible with the nature of the Roman state. Our cosmopolitanism could no more come to the light of day than a plant can germinate on a soil unable to nourish it. What is more, for Rome such a principle could only be fatal. Conversely, if the principle has appeared since, it is not as a result of philosophical discoveries. Nor is it because our minds have become receptive to truths that they failed to acknowledge. It is because changes have occurred in the social structure that have necessitated this change in morals. Thus morality is formed, transformed and maintained for reasons of an experimental kind. It is these reasons alone that the science of morality sets out to determine.

Yet because what we propose to study is above all reality, it does not follow that we should give up the idea of improving it. We would esteem our research not worth the labour of a single hour if its interest were merely speculative. If we distinguish carefully between theoretical and practical problems it is not in order to neglect the latter category. On the contrary, it is in order to put ourselves in a position where we can better resolve them. Yet it is customary to reproach all those who undertake the scientific study of morality with the inability to formulate an ideal. It is alleged that their respect for facts does not allow them to go beyond them, that they can indeed observe what exists, but are not able to provide us with rules for future conduct. We trust that this book will at least serve to weaken that prejudice, because we shall demonstrate in it how science can help in finding the direction in which our conduct ought to go, assisting us to determine the ideal that gropingly we seek. But we shall only be able to raise ourselves up to that ideal after having observed reality, for we shall distil the ideal from it. Indeed, is any

other procedure possible? Even the most boundless idealist can follow no other method, for an ideal is stayed upon nothing if its roots are not grounded in reality. All the difference resides in the fact that the idealists study reality in very cursory fashion. Often they merely content themselves with elevating some impulse of their sensibility, a rather sudden aspiration of the heart – *which is nevertheless only a fact* – into a kind of imperative before which their reason bows low, and they ask us to do likewise.

It will be objected that the method of observation lacks any rules by which to assess the facts that have been garnered. But the rule emerges from the facts themselves, as we shall have occasion to demonstrate. Firstly, a state of moral health exists that science alone can competently determine and, as it is nowhere wholly attained, it is already an ideal to strive towards it. Moreover, the conditions of this state change because societies evolve. The most serious practical problems that we have to resolve consist precisely in determining that state afresh, as a function of changes that have been effected in the environment. Science, by providing us with a law for the variations through which that state has already passed, allows us to anticipate those which are in progress and which the new order of things demands. If we know the direction in which the law of property is evolving as societies grow in size, becoming more densely concentrated, and if some increase in volume and density makes further modifications necessary, we shall be able to foresee them and, by foreseeing them, will them in advance. Finally, by comparing internally the normal type – a strictly scientific operation – we shall be able to discover that the latter is not entirely at harmony within itself, that it contains contradictions – imperfections – which we can then seek to eliminate or remedy. This is a new purpose that science proposes to the will. But, it may be argued, if science can foresee, it cannot command. This is true: it can only tell us what is needful for life. Yet how can we fail to see that, *assuming mankind wishes life to continue*, a very simple operation may immediately transform the laws that science has established into rules that are categorical for our behaviour? Doubtless, science then becomes an art. But the transition from one to the other occurs with no break in continuity. It remains to be ascertained whether we ought to wish to continue our existence, but even on this ultimate question we believe that science is not mute.<sup>2</sup>

But if the science of morality does not make us indifferent or

resigned spectators of reality, at the same time it teaches us to treat it with the utmost caution. It imparts to us a prudently conservative disposition of mind. Certain theories which claim to be scientific have been rightly reproached with being subversive and revolutionary. But this is because they are scientific in name only. In fact they erect a structure, but fail to observe. They see in morality not a set of acquired facts which must be studied, but a kind of legislation, always liable to be repealed, which every thinker works out afresh. Morality as really practised by men is then considered as a mere bundle of habits and prejudices which are of value only if they conform with the doctrine being put forward. As this doctrine is derived from the study of a principle that has not been induced from the observation of moral facts, but borrowed from sciences that are alien to it, it inevitably runs counter in more than one respect to the existing moral order. We, on the other hand, are less exposed to this danger than anyone, since morality for us is a system of facts that have been realised, linked to the total world system. Now a fact does not change in a trice, even when this may be desirable. Moreover, since it is solidly linked to other facts, it cannot be modified without these also being affected, and it is often very difficult to work out beforehand the end-result of this series of repercussions. Thus upon contemplating such risks, even the boldest spirit becomes more prudent. Finally, and above all, any fact of a vital nature – as moral facts are – cannot survive if it does not serve a purpose or correspond to some need. Thus, so long as the contrary has not been proved, it has a right to our respect. Undoubtedly it may turn out to be not all it should be, and consequently it may be appropriate to intervene, as we ourselves have just demonstrated. But then the intervention is limited: its purpose is not to construct in its entirety another morality alongside or above the predominant one, but to correct the latter, or partially to improve it.

Thus there disappears the antithesis that some have often attempted to establish between science and morality, an impressive argument whereby the mystics of every age have sought to undermine human reason. To regulate relationships with our fellow-men there is no need to resort to any means save those that serve to regulate our relationships with things; reflective thinking, methodically applied, suffices in both cases. What reconciles science and morality is the science of morality, for at the same time

as it teaches us to respect moral reality it affords us the means of improving it.

We therefore believe that the study of this book can and must be tackled without lack of confidence or any hidden misgivings. However, the reader must expect to meet with propositions that run counter to certain accepted ideas. Since we feel the need to understand, or to think we understand, the reasons for our behaviour, reflective thinking was applied to morality a considerable while before morality became the object of scientific study. Thus a certain mode in which to represent and explain to ourselves the main facts of moral life has become customary with us, and yet it is in no way scientific. This is because it arose unsystematically by chance, the result of a summary and perfunctory investigation, carried out, so to speak, incidentally. Unless we divest ourselves of these ready-made judgements, clearly we cannot embark upon the considerations that are to follow. Here as elsewhere, science presupposes the entire freedom of the mind. We must rid ourselves of those ways of perceiving and judging that long habit has implanted within us. We must rigorously subject ourselves to the discipline of methodical doubt. Moreover, this doubt entails no risk, for it relates not to moral reality, which is not in question, but to the explanation that incompetent and ill-informed thinking attributes to it.

We must make it incumbent upon us to allow no explanation that does not rely upon genuine proofs. The procedures we have employed to impart the greatest possible rigour to our proofs will be assessed. To submit an order of facts to the scrutiny of science it is not enough carefully to observe, describe and classify them. But – and this is much more difficult – we must also, in Descartes' phrase, discover the perspective from which they become scientific, that is, find in them some objective element which is capable of precise determination and, if possible, measurement. We have attempted to satisfy this, the condition of all science. In particular, it will be seen how we have studied social solidarity through the system of juridical rules, how in the search for causes, we have laid aside everything that too readily lends itself to personal judgements and subjective appraisal – this so as to penetrate certain facts of social structure profound enough to be objects of the understanding, and consequently of science. At the same time we have imposed upon ourselves a rule that obliges us to refrain from the method too often

followed by those sociologists who, to prove their thesis, content themselves with citing in no specific order and at random a more or less imposing number of favourable facts without worrying about those that are contradictory. We have been concerned to institute genuine experiments, that is, methodical comparisons. Nevertheless, no matter how numerous the precautions observed, it is absolutely certain that such attempts can remain only very imperfect. But, however defective they may be, we deem it necessary to attempt them. Indeed there is only one way to create a science, and that is to dare to do so, but to do so with method. It is doubtless impossible to undertake the task if all raw data for it is lacking. On the other hand we buoy ourselves up with a vain hope if we believe that the best means of preparing for the coming of a new science is first patiently to accumulate all the data it will use. For we cannot know which it will require unless we have already formed some conception of it and its needs, and consequently whether it exists.

The question that has been the starting point for our study has been that of the connection between the individual personality and social solidarity. How does it come about that the individual, whilst becoming more autonomous, depends ever more closely upon society? How can he become at the same time more of an individual and yet more linked to society? For it is indisputable that these two movements, however contradictory they appear to be, are carried on in tandem. Such is the nature of the problem that we have set ourselves. It has seemed to us that what resolved this apparent antimony was the transformation of social solidarity which arises from the ever-increasing division of labour. This is how we have been led to make this the subject of our study.<sup>3</sup>

#### Notes

1. The reproach has been made (Beudant, *Le droit individuel et l'Etat*, p. 244) that we have at some stage characterised this question of freedom as 'subtle'. For us, the expression was in no way used scornfully. If we set this question on one side it is solely because the solution given to it, *whatever that may be*, cannot hinder our research.
2. We touch upon it a little later. Cf. *infra*, Book II, Chapter 1, p. 190.
3. We need not recall that the question of social solidarity has already been studied in the second part of Marion, *La Solidarité morale*. But Marion tackled the problem from a different viewpoint, being above all concerned with establishing the reality of the phenomenon of solidarity.

## Preface to the Second Edition

### Some Remarks on Professional Groups

In republishing this book we have refrained from modifying its original structure. A book possesses an individuality that it ought to retain. It is fitting to leave intact the appearance under which it has become known.<sup>1</sup>

Yet there is one idea that remained somewhat obscure in the first edition which it seems useful to us to bring out more clearly and precisely, for it will throw light on certain parts of the present work and even on what we have published since.<sup>2</sup> It concerns the role that professional groups are called upon to fulfil at the present time in the social organisation of peoples. If originally we only touched obliquely upon this problem,<sup>3</sup> it is because we were intending to take it up again, making it the object of a special study. Since other preoccupations have arisen to divert us from this project, and since we do not see when it will be possible for us to carry it out, we would like to take advantage of this second edition to show how this question is linked to the subject dealt with in the rest of this book, indicating the terms in which it is posed, and attempting especially to dispose of the reasons that still prevent too many minds from comprehending the urgency and importance of the problem. Such is the purpose of this new preface.

#### I

In the course of this book, on a number of occasions we emphasise the state of legal and moral anomie in which economic life exists at

# Introduction

## The Problem

Although the division of labour is not of recent origin, it was only at the end of the last century that societies began to become aware of this law, to which up to then they had submitted almost unwittingly. Undoubtedly even from antiquity several thinkers had perceived its importance.<sup>1</sup> Yet Adam Smith was the first to attempt to elaborate the theory of it. Moreover, it was he who first coined the term, which social science later lent to biology.

Nowadays the phenomenon has become so widespread that it catches everyone's attention. We can no longer be under any illusion about the trends in modern industry. It involves increasingly powerful mechanisms, large-scale groupings of power and capital, and consequently an extreme division of labour: Inside factories, not only are jobs demarcated, becoming extremely specialised, but each product is itself a speciality entailing the existence of others. Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill persisted in hoping that agriculture at least would prove an exception to the rule, seeing in it the last refuge of small-scale ownership. Although in such a matter we must guard against generalising unduly, nowadays it appears difficult to deny that the main branches of the agricultural industry are increasingly swept along in the general trend.<sup>2</sup> Finally, commerce itself contrives ways to follow and reflect, in all their distinctive nuances, the boundless diversity of industrial undertakings. Although this evolution occurs spontaneously and unthinkingly, those economists who study its causes and evaluate its results, far from condemning such diversification or attacking it, proclaim its necessity. They perceive in it the higher law of human societies and the condition for progress.

Yet the division of labour is not peculiar to economic life. We can observe its increasing influence in the most diverse sectors of society. Functions, whether political, administrative or judicial, are becoming more and more specialised. The same is true in the arts and sciences. The time lies far behind us when philosophy constituted the sole science. It has become fragmented into a host of special disciplines, each having its purpose, method and ethos. 'From one half-century to another the men who have left their mark upon the sciences have become more specialized.'<sup>3</sup>

Having to pinpoint the nature of the studies which for over two centuries had engaged the most celebrated scientists, de Candolle noted that in the age of Leibnitz and Newton he would have had to write down:

two or three descriptions almost always for each scientist: for example, astronomer and physicist, or mathematician, astronomer and physicist, or alternatively, to use only such general terms as philosopher or naturalist. Even that would not have been enough. Mathematicians and naturalists were sometimes scholars or poets. Even at the end of the eighteenth century, a number of designations would have been needed to indicate precisely what was remarkable about men such as Wolff, Haller or Charles Bonnet in several different branches of science and letters. In the nineteenth century this difficulty no longer exists or at least occurs very infrequently.<sup>4</sup>

Not only is the scientist no longer immersed in different sciences at the same time, but he can no longer encompass the whole field of one science. The range of his research is limited to a finite category of problems or even to a single one of them. Likewise, the functions of the scientist which formerly were almost always exercised alongside another more lucrative one, such as that of doctor, priest, magistrate or soldier, are increasingly sufficient by themselves. De Candolle even predicts that one day not too far distant the profession of scientist and that of teacher, at present still so closely linked, will be irrevocably separated.

The recent philosophical speculations in biology have finally caused us to realise that the division of labour is a fact of a generality that the economists, who were the first to speak of it, had been incapable of suspecting. Indeed, since the work of Wolff, von Baer and Milne-Edwards we know that the law of the division of labour

applies to organisms as well as to societies. It may even be stated that an organism occupies the more exalted a place in the animal hierarchy the more specialised its functions are. This discovery has had the result of not only enlarging enormously the field of action of the division of labour, but also of setting its origins back into an infinitely distant past, since it becomes almost contemporaneous with the coming of life upon earth. It is no longer a mere social institution whose roots lie in the intelligence and the will of men, but a general biological phenomenon, the conditions for which must seemingly be sought in the essential properties of organised matter. The division of labour in society appears no more than a special form of this general development. In conforming to this law societies apparently yield to a movement that arose long before they existed and which sweeps along in the same direction the whole of the living world.

Such a fact clearly cannot manifest itself without affecting profoundly our moral constitution, for the evolution of mankind will develop in two utterly opposing directions, depending on whether we abandon ourselves to this tendency or whether we resist it. Yet, then, one question poses itself urgently: of these two directions, which one should we choose? Is it our duty to seek to become a rounded, complete creature, a whole sufficient unto itself or, on the contrary, to be only a part of the whole, the organ of an organism? In short, whilst the division of labour is a law of nature, is it also a moral rule for human conduct and, if it possesses this last characteristic, through what causes and to what extent? There is no need to demonstrate the serious nature of this practical problem: whatever assessment we make of the division of labour, we all sense that it is, and increasingly so, one of the fundamental bases of the social order.

The problem is one that the moral consciousness of nations has often posed, but in a muddled fashion, and without being able to resolve it. Two opposing tendencies confront one another, and neither has succeeded in gaining entirely the upper hand.

It seems undoubtedly clear that the view is gaining ground that the division of labour should become a categorical rule of behaviour, one that should be imposed as a duty. It is true that those who infringe it are not meted out any precise punishment laid down by law, but they do suffer rebuke. The time is past when the perfect man seemed to us the one who, capable of being interested in

everything but attaching himself exclusively to nothing, able to savour everything and understand everything, found the means to combine and epitomise within himself the finest aspects of civilisation. Today that general culture, once so highly extolled, no longer impresses us save as a flabby, lax form of discipline.<sup>5</sup> To struggle against nature we need to possess more vigorous faculties, deploy more productive energies. We desire our activity to be concentrated, instead of being scattered over a wide area, gaining in intensity what it has lost in breadth. We are wary of those too volatile men of talent, who, lending themselves equally to all forms of employment, refuse to choose for themselves a special role and to adhere to it. We feel a coolness towards those men whose sole preoccupation is to organise their faculties, limbering them up, but without putting them to any special use or sacrificing a single one, as if each man among them ought to be self-sufficient, constituting his own independent world. It appears to us that such a state of detachment and indeterminateness is somewhat antisocial. The man of parts, as he once was, is for us no more than a dilettante, and we accord no moral value to dilettantism. Rather, do we perceive perfection in the competent man, one who seeks not to be complete but to be productive, one who has a well-defined job to which he devotes himself, and carries out his task, ploughing his single furrow. 'To perfect oneself,' says Secrétant, 'is to learn one's role, to make oneself fit to fulfil one's function. . . . The yardstick for our perfection is no longer to be found in satisfaction with ourselves, in the plaudits of the crowd or the approving smile of an affected dilettantism, but in the sum total of services rendered, and in our ability to continue to render them.'<sup>6</sup> Thus the moral ideal, from being the sole one, simple and impersonal, has become increasingly diversified. We no longer think that the exclusive duty of man is to realise within himself the qualities of man in general, but we believe that he is no less obliged to have those qualities that relate to his employment. One fact, among others, reflects this view: this is the increasingly specialist character assumed by education. More and more we deem it necessary not to subject all children to a uniform culture, as if all were destined to lead the same life, but to train them differently according to the varying functions they will be called upon to fulfil. In short, in one of its aspects the categorical imperative of the moral consciousness is coming to assume the following form: *Equip yourself to fulfil usefully a specific function.*

Yet, confronted with these facts, we can cite others that contradict them. If public opinion recognises the rule of the division of labour, it is not without some anxiety and hesitation. Whilst commanding men to specialise, it has always seemingly the fear that they will do so to excess. Side by side with maxims extolling intensive labour are others, no less widely current, which alert us to its dangers. 'It is,' declares Jean-Baptiste Say, 'sad to have to confess that one has never produced more than the eighteenth part of a pin; and do not let us imagine that it is solely the workman who all his life wields a file and hammer, who demeans the dignity of his nature in this way. It is also the man who, through his status, exercises the most subtle faculties of his mind.'<sup>7</sup> At the very beginning of the century Lemontey,<sup>8</sup> comparing the existence of the modern worker to the free and easy life of the savage, found the latter more favoured than the former. Nor is de Tocqueville any less severe. 'As the principle of the division of labour is ever increasingly applied,' he states, 'art makes progress but the artisan regresses.'<sup>9</sup> Generally speaking, the maxim that decrees that we should specialise is as if refuted everywhere by its opposite, which bids us all realise the same ideal, one that is far from having lost all authority. In principle this conflict of ideas is certainly not surprising. Moral life, like that of body and mind, responds to different needs which may even be contradictory. Thus it is natural for it to be made up in part of opposing elements, which have a mutually limiting and balancing effect. Nevertheless, there is truly something about so marked an antimony which should trouble the moral consciousness of nations. It needs indeed to be able to explain how such a contradiction can arise.

To end this state of indecision we shall not resort to the normal method of the moralists who, wishing to decide upon the moral worth of a precept, start by laying down a general formula for morality, and then measure the disputed maxim up against it. Nowadays we know how little value may be attached to such summary generalisations.<sup>10</sup> Set out at the beginning of a study, before any observation of the facts, their purpose is not to account for them, but to enunciate the abstract principle for an ideal legislative code to be created out of nothing. Thus these generalisations do not summarise for us the essential characteristics which moral rules really represent in a particular society or in a determinate social type. They merely express the manner in which

the moralist himself conceives morality. In this respect they assuredly do not cease to be instructive, for they inform us of the trends in morality that are emerging at the moment in question. But they merely possess the interest appertaining to one fact, not that of a scientific view. We are in no way justified in seeing in the personal aspirations that a thinker feels, however real these may be, an adequate expression of moral reality. They interpret needs that are never more than a part of the whole. They correspond to some special, determined desideratum that the consciousness, by an illusion customary to it, elevates to one ultimate single goal. How often do such aspirations even turn out to be of a morbid nature! We cannot therefore refer to them as objective criteria enabling us to assess the morality of the practices that occur.

We must lay on one side such deductions, which are usually employed only to give the semblance of an argument and to justify, after the event, preconceived sentiments and personal impressions. The sole means of successfully evaluating objectively the division of labour is first to study it in itself, in an entirely speculative fashion, investigating its utility and on what it is contingent – in short, to form for ourselves as adequate an idea of it as possible. When this has been accomplished, we are in a position to compare it with other moral phenomena and perceive what relationship it entertains with them. If we find that it plays a role similar to some other practice whose moral and normal character is unquestionable; that in certain cases it does not fulfil that role it is because of abnormal deviations; and that if the causes that determine it are also the determining conditions for other moral rules, then we shall be able to conclude that it may be classified with those rules. Thus, without seeking to substitute ourselves for the moral consciousness of societies, without claiming to legislate in its place, we shall be able to bring some enlightenment to that consciousness and reduce its perplexities.

Our study will therefore be divided into three main sections.

We shall first investigate the function of the division of labour, that is, the social need to which it corresponds.

Next, we shall determine the causes and conditions upon which it depends.

Finally, as it would not have been the subject of such serious charges against it did it not in reality deviate more or less frequently from the normal state, we shall aim to classify the principal

abnormal forms that it assumes, in order to avoid confusing them with the rest. In addition, the study will be of interest because, as in biology, the pathological here will enable us to understand better the physiological.

Moreover, if there has been so much argument about the moral value of the division of labour it is much less because agreement is lacking upon a general formula for morality than because the questions of fact we propose to tackle have been unduly neglected. Reasoning about these has always been as if they were self-evident – as if, in order to know the nature, role and causes of the division of labour, it was enough to analyse the conception of them that each one of us possesses. Such a method does not lead to any scientific conclusions. Thus since Adam Smith the theory of the division of labour has made very little progress. 'His successors,' declares Schmöller,<sup>11</sup> 'with a notable poverty of ideas, clung stubbornly to his examples and observations, until the time when the socialists broadened their perspective and contrasted the division of labour in factories today with that in the workshops of the eighteenth century. Even so, the theory has not been developed in any systematic and profound way. The technological considerations and the true but banal observations by some economists could not, furthermore, particularly favour the development of these ideas.' To understand objectively the division of labour it is not enough to develop the substance of the conception we have of it. We should rather treat it as an objective fact, to be observed and comparisons made. As we shall see, the result of these observations is often different from what the intimate meaning suggests to us.<sup>12</sup>

#### Notes

1. Οὐ γὰρ ἐχ' δύο ἰατρῶν γίνεται χοινοῖα, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἰατροῦ καὶ δεωργου καὶ δλωξ ἑτέρων οὐχ ἰσῶν, *Nichomachean Ethics*, E. 1133a, 16.
2. *Journal des économistes* (November 1884) p. 211.
3. De Candolle, *Histoire des Sciences et des Savants*, 2nd edn, p. 263.
4. *Ibid.*
5. This passage has occasionally been construed as implying a root and branch condemnation of any kind of general culture. In reality, as the context makes plain, we are speaking here only of humanist culture, which is indeed a general culture, but not the only possible one.
6. Secrétant, *Le principe de la morale*, p. 189.



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7. J.-B. Say, *Traité d'économie politique*, book I, ch. 8.
8. Lemontey, *Raison ou folie*: chapter on the influence of the division of labour.
9. De Tocqueville, *La démocratie en Amérique*.
10. In the first edition of this book, we developed at length the reasons which, in our view, prove the sterility of this method. Today we believe that we can be more brief. There are arguments that should not be indefinitely prolonged.
11. 'La division du travail étudiée au point de vue historique', *Revue d'économie politique* (1889) p. 567.
12. Since 1893 two works have appeared, or about which we have come to hear, which concern the question treated in our book. First, there is Simmel's *Soziale Differenzierung* (Leipzig, pp. vii and 147), which does not deal especially with the division of labour but with the process of individual specialisation in general. Next, there is the work by Bücher, *Die Entstehung der Volkswirtschaft*, recently translated into French as *Etudes d'histoire d'économie politique* (Alcan, Paris, 1901), several chapters of which are given over to the economic division of labour.

## Book I

# The Function of the Division of Labour